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Plato’s Irony

Plato’s Republic remains one of the most influential texts of the Western canon, surviving
millenia of various translations and interpretations. Traditional interpretations of the Republic
contend that there is not a distinction between philosophy and politics and that Plato’s
presentation of Socrates’ dialogue with Glaucon and Adeimantus reflects the author’s own ideas.
Socrates’ Kallipolis, the “just city,” serves as an early example of totalitarian governance that
parallels modern regimes in countries like Cuba or North Korea. Although Plato was in fact a
student of Socrates, he did not necessarily have to agree with everything his teacher argued;
additionally, contemporary scholars such as Allan Bloom beg the question as to whether the
Kallipolis was actually an ironic and satirical construction thought up by Socrates that he
ultimately knew was absurd and impossible. Looking closely at the Republic, it seems doubtful
that Plato truly was as illiberal and antidemocratic as he may seem at first glance: Kallipolis was
almost certainly not Plato’s own ideal political constitution.
From a modern scholar’s point of view, it is irrefutable that Kallipolis as a polis is
unrealistic and unattainable, as it is an ideal very far removed from human nature. Plato’s
Republic as a whole underscores the limitations of politics by emphasizing this aforementioned
disparity between human nature and the just city: Kallipolis abstracts from the body and
philosopher-kings can not possibly make good rulers. Plato allows his audience to see the
conflict between striving for the good of the individual and the good of a whole community:
since an individual finds his “eudaimonia” in studying philosophy, it is against the philosopher’s
nature to truly rule for the common good. This notion is antithetical to Socrates’ supposed claim
that the only people fit to rule the just city are philosophers and that the highest well-being for

humans is only achievable by reconciling philosophy and politics.
It is possible that Socrates’ argument is ironic, meaning that he suggests one thing to
Glaucon, Adeimantus, and others in the dialogue, but actually means something entirely different
(i.e., he presents Kallipolis as natural but inwardly understands that it is not). If one were to
pursue this path of reasoning, they would come to the conclusion that Plato, too, was being an
ironist in writing the Republic. Plato catalogs his teacher’s experiment, relaying its
ups-and-downs until the very end, no matter how increasingly outlandish and unnatural Socrates’
rules for the just city become. He must be aware of the lunacy of Socrates’ claims: after all, the
process of recording the dialogue for posterity required some mode of thought and would
provoke inquiry into anything he may have found disagreeable or preposterous. As Aristotle
writes in his Nicomachean Ethics, “Ironists, who tend to say less than they are, appear more
refined in their characters.” (1127b23-24) Socrates as an ironist seems to be a common theme in
much of literature written on the famous philosopher, and Aristotle himself (a student of Plato)
agreed with contemporary analysts in this regard. It is a logical assumption, therefore, that
Kallipolis was not an entirely serious “just city,” but rather Socrates’ satirical take on limits of
politics and philosophy in the Republic.
Some aspects of Socrates’ (and Plato’s) argument seem almost comical, furthering the
possibility of ironic intentions with the development of Kallipolis. For example, Book V of the
Republic, which focuses on womens’ lives in the just city, contains striking similarities to
Aristophanes’ Assemblywomen, or Ἐκκλησιάζουσαι. In this play written to criticize the Athenian
government, a group of women take control of the city, instituting reforms that ban private
wealth and enforce equity between the sexes (particularly beneficial measures for old and
unattractive women). Socrates seems to have been inspired by this play in Book V, where he
acknowledges that women have the same individual ranking of their spirits as men and that they

too have a place in the just city. However, when reading the text, it is difficult to believe that
Socrates or Plato valued our contemporary notion of “women’s rights” at all, or any form of
equality, for that matter: there is an understanding that women, albeit members of Kallipolis,
would always be inferior to men in every category. It is, therefore, not too ridiculous to suggest
that Plato may have been trying to outdo Aristophanes in his own version of comic satire.
Kallipolis is also simply contrary to human nature. It is most saliently abnormal in limiting man’s
innate desires, primarily sexual eros, in addition to abolishing privacy and the structure of the
family in favor of a communal lifestyle (remniscent of People’s Communes in Maoist China, for
example). However, Socrates is clear to emphasize that the city is natural, as it is based on both
man’s most basic needs and a division of labor and leadership that parallels the internal hierarchy
of the soul: reason, desire, and spiritedness (thumos). Essentially, Socrates uses the tripartite soul
to justify the social network of Kallipolis. He may have had more ground to stand on if his
argument was based in reality; however, Plato is clear to emphasize that the organization of
Kallipolis is based on the “noble lie.” (414c [p. 93]) Essentially, in order to ensure the success of
the city, the guardian class would have to lie to the citizens about nearly every aspect of their
lives. The Myth of the Metals and the belief that all citizens were born of the ground of Kallipolis
would be utilized to dull the minds of the populace into believing that the hierarchy they found
themselves in was the natural order of things. However, Socrates acknowledges that Kallipolis
would be destined to fail, even if the guardians attempted to keep up the noble lie, falling into
tyranny. Plato displays Socrates’ reasoning in a way that conveys these lies as ultimately
unconducive for a successful city, thereby demonstrating his own beliefs: that Kallipolis as an
illiberal authoritarian government is not only impossible, but worthless to even try.
The unnaturalness of Kallipolis is subsequently extended to its ruling class: the
philosopher-kings. In order to argue that a ruling class of philosophers is unnatural, the question

of justice developed in the Republic must be addressed (although a definite conclusion as to what
justice is is never reached in the dialogue itself). As stated before, individual justice may be
understood as the internal harmony of reason, desire, and spiritedness. Only the philosopher can
achieve this harmony of the soul, and consequently justice itself. In addition to the harmony of
the soul, Socrates also advocated for the harmony of philosophy and politics for the success of
Kallipolis. However, the previous notion of justice in conjunction with the harmony of
philosophy and politics would be impossible with philosophers in charge of the city. The
philosopher can only be just on the individual level because he has an understanding of eternal
forms, which others in the city do not. On the other hand, all people can be “just” in the civic
sense, or in service to the polis as a whole. Although both of these types of justice are discussed
in the Republic, Plato does not successfully connect them in a way that argues that men naturally
should wish to serve the polis. Bloom writes, “The question is whether… devotion to the
common good leads to the health of the soul or whether the man with a healthy soul is devoted to
the common good.” (Bloom, 337) Therefore, humans do not have a natural imperative to be good
citizens, and Kallipolis requires that the philosophers be unnaturally good by serving the interest
of the people rather than their own self-interest. This leads to the conclusion that the entire
structure of the polis is unnatural, and, in relaying the duties of the philosopher-kings the way he
does, Plato stresses how Kallipolis is destined to be dysfunctional, revealing his own misgivings
towards Socrates’ plan of the ideal just city.
Much evidence exists to support the argument that Plato did not truly believe all he
espoused in the Republic. That Plato was not as “antiliberal and antidemocratic” as he may seem
is a relatively recent opinion that is dismissive of traditional interpretations, but it is nonetheless
very probable, given the amount of aforementioned evidence in this paper. However, it is
important to acknowledge that contemporary Platonic scholars will never be fully sure of Plato’s

true opinions. As it is impossible to ask Plato about his true convictions and to see whether
Socrates himself even believed what he said in the Republic, all interpretations of the text, if
properly supported, cannot be invalidated. Ultimately, the Socratic paradox, which says that
wisdom is found in acknowledging ignorance, is a valuable lesson to take into account when
analyzing and interpreting Plato’s Republic.
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